BOND, SCHOENECK & KING PLLC Attorneys for Defendant Federico Azevedo

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BY: THOMAS A. MARTIN, ESQ.

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OCT1MARC 1 (Case called) THE DEPUTY CLERK: Can counsel, starting with the 2 3 plaintiff, please state your name for the record. 4 MS. CLANCY: Your Honor, Olivia Clancy, plaintiff's 5 counsel. THE COURT: This is Judge Cronan. Good afternoon, 6 7 Ms. Clancy. 8 And the plaintiff is here as well, I believe? 9 DR. MARCINIAK: Yes. Karolina Marciniak, plaintiff. 10 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Marciniak. 11 And for the defendants, we'll start on my right, the far left. 12 13 MR. WONG: This is Marco Wong of Goodwin Procter on 14 behalf of MIT. MS. BADDISH: Noa Baddish on behalf of Rockefeller 15 16 University and Dr. Winrich Freiwald. 17 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 18 MS. BADDISH: And I have my colleague Pat Lamparello 19 with me as well. 20 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 21 MR. LAMPARELLO: Good afternoon. 22 MR. MARTIN: Thomas Martin, Bond, Schoeneck & King, for defendant Federico Azevedo.

THE COURT: And good afternoon. I'm sorry.

your name just now. Your name again?

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1 MR. MARTIN: Thomas Martin. 2 THE COURT: Martin. Okay. Thank you. 3 So I wanted to call this conference, and I'll note that Ms. Clancy is appearing remotely via telephone because I 4 5 understand she is under the weather, but are you able to hear us okay, Ms. Clancy? 6 7 MS. CLANCY: Yes, I can hear you well, your Honor, 8 yes. Thank you. 9 THE COURT: So I wanted to have this conference for a 10 few reasons—first, to discuss Ms. Clancy's representation of 11 the plaintiff, and also to discuss efforts to try to figure out the terms of a dismissal of this case. 12 13 Ms. Goncalves, do I understand from your letter and 14 other submissions that I've received that you have decided to 15 discharge Ms. Clancy as your attorney in this matter? 16 DR. MARCINIAK: Yes, that's correct, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: And Ms. Clancy filed a motion to be 18 relieved as counsel as well. 19 One complication here, which I think is easily dealt 20 with, is that there is a suggestion—probably more than a 21 suggestion—that the defendants may move for Rule 11 sanctions against Ms. Clancy based on the filing of the amended 22 23 complaint. Maybe I should check first with the defendants

whether that is still a possibility of a Rule 11 motion in this

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case?

MS. BADDISH: Your Honor, I think that it is, especially if the claims against our clients, Rockefeller and Dr. Freiwald, are not dismissed with prejudice, subject to the carveouts we discussed a couple of weeks ago.

THE COURT: Okay. So I will relieve Ms. Clancy, but in doing so, I specifically reserve jurisdiction over any subsequent Rule 11 sanctions motion against her. Ms. Clancy, do you understand that?

MS. CLANCY: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me try to understand whether it's possible to reach an agreement on the terms of dismissal. The issue continues to be whether the claims in this case are dismissed with or without prejudice, I take it? Nothing has changed there?

MS. BADDISH: Yes. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And Ms. Baddish, has it been discussed with the plaintiff herself?

MS. BADDISH: We have not engaged in any further discussions with the plaintiff because she was still technically represented by Ms. Clancy.

THE COURT: That's what I suspected.

MR. WONG: And—sorry, your Honor—we did engage with plaintiff on this specific issue, for MIT, and we were unable to reach agreement.

THE COURT: So to the extent I might be able to help a

bit, what is the area of disagreement here? Go ahead.

MS. BADDISH: I mean, I think I can explain what it is. I think plaintiff wants to be able to, now that she—she filed two duplicative lawsuits, which we know. And now she wants to basically avoid any consequences for doing so, and she wants to amend her complaint in Marciniak I, where we've all filed premotion letters to dismiss already for the second time, and she wants to amend the claims that were in this case, so she would avoid any consequence of the dismissal and what she has put all of the defendants through with respect to extensive motion practice already, a number of substantive premotion letters, Rule 11 letters, and she wants to basically avoid all consequences for what she and her counsel have done, and we just do not think that's acceptable.

THE COURT: And at our last conference we had discussed the possibility of language that would dismiss the claim in this case with prejudice but with the understanding that it would not affect the ability to proceed on those same claims before Judge Carter in Marciniak I. Is that still something the defendants would be amenable to?

MS. BADDISH: To the extent that those claims are currently asserted in the second amended complaint, which is the third complaint she filed in *Marciniak I*. We don't think she should be able to now, after over a year of briefing and going back and forth on this action, to just add those claims

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that were dismissed in this action to Marciniak I.

THE COURT: Ms. Goncalves, did you have a chance to read my opinion in this case on your claim?

DR. MARCINIAK: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: And you certainly should read it and focus on exactly what I said there, but essentially the issue was that the claims in this case were very much the same as those that are before Judge Carter in your other case and therefore I concluded that they cannot continue here. I then gave you the opportunity to file an amended complaint, which your lawyer did, and the argument of the defendants is that this doesn't cure any of the issues that I identified in my opinion, and giving a look to that complaint, it seems like there may be some merit to what they are arguing. You can continue to bring your claims that you have before Judge Carter. He's obviously a different judge in a different case. But the concern of the defendants is that they don't want to be in a position where the claims are dismissed without prejudice, then we're back here again with new claims being brought. Do you understand what I'm saying?

DR. MARCINIAK: I understand that the concern is that I will bring another action, like *Marciniak II*?

THE COURT: Is that right, more or less?

MS. BADDISH: Yes, and we also have the additional issue of Dr. Freiwald.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BADDISH: And we think all claims against him should be dismissed with prejudice.

THE COURT: So I cannot require parties to enter into a stipulation, although it did seem to me at our last conference that we were very, very close. Ms. Goncalves, is there a reason you would not be agreeable to stipulation in this case that says that this action is dismissed with prejudice except to the extent that a dismissal with prejudice in this case would not affect any current claims that you have brought in your other case? Is that not acceptable to you?

DR. MARCINIAK: That will be acceptable with respect to the defendant Rockefeller University because I am proceeding Title IX—title VII claims in the first lawsuit against the institutional defendant. However, I am claiming that I'm eligible to bring my claims against the individuals, and I wanted to bring Dr. Freiwald and Dr. Azevedo in the first claim as well, in the first complaint as well.

THE COURT: Part of the problem with that is that—I discussed Dr. Azevedo's situation in my prior opinion. Is there a reason why he was not named in the first case that you brought?

DR. MARCINIAK: Yes. I was proceeding pro se. I didn't have any adequate knowledge to—to know how to properly name defendants, and nevertheless, I wanted to acknowledge that

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I-I was diligent in my amendments. The first amendment that I did process, that I filed in front of Judge Carter, in April last year, was focused specifically to address defendants' concern about exhaustion of administrative remedies. able to collect right to sue letters and I was able to bring allegations to the extent I was capable at that point. However, as I mentioned in my letter, due to Ms. Clancy's negligence and incompetence—I mean, the idea to amend the first complaint to bring the individuals, that was the purpose that I engaged the firm, and Ms. Clancy specifically, and it was—it was assumed, if not for the mistake of Ms. Clancy, a mistake of law, which is allowed to bring the claims based on the relation back doctrine, I would be able to add defendant Freiwald and defendant Azevedo successfully in the first complaint. THE COURT: And this is to the defendants: Who is not named before Judge Carter that was named here? Is it just-MS. BADDISH: Dr. Freiwald and Azevedo. DR. MARCINIAK: Dr. Azevedo. THE COURT: Dr. Azevedo too? There's a gentleman raising his hand in the courtroom. I don't know who he is. UNIDENTIFIED SPECTATOR: I'm Karolina's husband. I tell her something? THE COURT: You may sit next to your wife if you wish,

although I do want to make sure only she speaks, so you may do that. As you speak to her, I do want the defendants to think about what you propose as the course of action here, since it is a bit of an unusual posture.

MS. BADDISH: I have a proposal, your Honor.

THE COURT: Please.

MS. BADDISH: And I also note that the plaintiff named Dr. Freiwald as a defendant in her New York State Division of Human Rights charge, so to me this seems like an intentional strategic decision that she did not name him in any of her complaints in Marciniak I, and then she chose to name him in Marciniak II in an attempt to distinguish the two cases so that she could proceed on two lawsuits. So I don't think that that conduct should be rewarded, and I just would be remiss if I didn't say that.

One proposal that I had is that you could dismiss the claims against Dr. Freiwald with prejudice except to the extent that Judge Carter finds that she can add him as a defendant in that case. I do not believe that she will be able to establish that the relation back doctrine applies. She can't bring a Title VII claim against him. Title VII doesn't recognize individual liability. As to the New York State and New York City Human Rights Law, the statute of limitations is three years. She stopped working at Rockefeller on November 30, 2021. Her claims are time barred.

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Given what has gone on and the procedural mess that was created in this case, it's clear that she chose to name Dr. Freiwald in Marciniak II as opposed to Marciniak I to gain a strategic advantage. There's a New York State Court of Appeals case that says that relation back doctrine does not apply in those circumstances. Happy to make that argument in front of Judge Carter if you would like to reserve that issue for him. But I think that would be a just result.

THE COURT: Let me hear from plaintiff.

DR. MARCINIAK: Yes. I am happy to explain. think the argument that intention—it was my intentional conduct is just absurd. And your Honor, my engagement with Shegerian & Associates culminating in attorney-client contract signed on August 10 last year, which I mentioned in my letter, was a result of thorough evaluation of my case by the firm, and this process included an initial intake interview and more in-depth consultation, and a comprehensive review of relevant documentation, including ongoing Marciniak I complaint. there was confidence in me winning the case that caused the contract to emerge. And during my initial call with Mrs. Clancy on August 14th, she represented to be very familiar with the case and that she was working on amending the original complaint to add Mr. Freiwald and Mr. Azevedo as defendants, and to assert claim under the newly enacted Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act and Adult Survivors Act, the legal

avenues I was previously unaware of. Mrs. Clancy refused my proposal to help with amendments, and she delegated the crucial task of gathering witness statements to me, a layperson with no legal training, which I subsequently did. And I did it diligently. Ms. Clancy was active on the case, as she was entering potential victims, and for example, on September 27, 2023, Ms. Clancy reached out to seek permissions of the potential—permission, seek my permission to forward the first complaint to the—to one of the potential victims. I agreed.

On November 6, 2023, the court in *Marciniak I* entered a briefing schedule for defendants' motion to dismiss, and only then Ms. Clancy filed her notice of appearance, more than three months after signing the contract. And even at that point I had no reason to suspect Ms. Clancy actions were not ones seeking to amend the complaint.

On November 17, 2023, with a deadline to file claims under the Adult Survivors Act approaching, I contacted Ms. Clancy about the "next steps regarding adding the individual perpetrators," meaning Mr. Freiwald and Mr. Azevedo, to the lawsuit. Ms. Clancy responded by informing me that she had begun drafting a new complaint to address these issues, stating, "I have begun composing a complaint which includes the same factual statements alleged in your first amended complaint to bring claims against the individual perpetrators. This new action will be filed Monday or Tuesday, ahead of the deadline,"

and we will motion to consolidate the matter. And she said it's the easiest— "It's the easiest way to add these two new defendants, given the extensive number of defendants and the soon-to-be-filed motion to dismiss." Ms. Clancy further directed me to the task of contacting the witnesses.

I was surprised by the decision, as our prior discussions had focused on amending the existing Marciniak I complaint. I was not provided with the opportunity to review or discuss this new course of action before Ms. Clancy proceeded with filing Marciniak II. Me, as a client, I relied on her, my attorney, for strategic decisions, and I did not have the same level of control and understanding of legal procedures as the attorney. I simply relied on Ms. Clancy's expertise.

Ms. Clancy also did not discuss with me her timeline and why she waited until January 5th to file motion to consolidate the two cases and requested a stay motion, which was already pending.

On December 15, defendants in  ${\it Marciniak}\ {\it I}$  moved to dismiss the complaint.

On December 18, I offered to assist Ms. Clancy in preparing the opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss Marciniak I, and throughout the following weeks I provided detailed suggestions and comments, but my input was not incorporated into the final filings ultimately proving

detrimental to the case.

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Ms. Clancy moved to consolidate the two matters, as I mentioned, only on January 5, but because defendants' motion to dismiss was pending, the court denied Ms. Clancy's request.

Ms. Clancy did not discuss with me her strategy going forward. Although I kept writing my comments and suggestions on opposing defendants' motion to dismiss in *Marciniak II*,

Ms. Clancy did not implement my input as she promised she will make sure she will.

Following your Honor's order from September 29 and Judge Carter's order on September 30 this year, I contacted Ms. Clancy to discuss the next steps in the litigation. I inquired, "What will be the next step? I guess we could request an extension of time to file amended pleadings." When I received no response, I followed up three days later, on October 3rd, and I emphasized the urgency of the situation, stating "Could you please provide an update on the next steps. My husband and I understand that submitting amended pleadings is our last opportunity for justice." I requested a call to discuss the matter further, which Ms. Clancy scheduled for the following day. And during that call, Ms. Clancy indicated that she would not be focusing on amending Marciniak I. She stated that she would instead focus on correcting issues in Marciniak II, suggesting that this approach was easier and required less She also indicated that as she would not require my

assistance in *Marciniak II*, my help was welcome in providing input to *Marciniak I*, which I did, including adding gender violence claim.

In the following two weeks, I was providing Ms. Clancy with my comments, suggestions, and draftings on the pleadings in Marciniak I. However, I did not receive any draft pleadings from Ms. Clancy for my review, nor her final version for my approval, as she had previously promised. I reached out to Ms. Clancy to inquire the status of the amended complaint for Marciniak II at one point, and she responded only on the day of the filing, on October 29, indicating that the amendment would focus solely on adding the New York City Gender-Motivated Violence Act claim to address the claim-splitting issue and send me a draft which she was about to file. While Ms. Clancy initially agreed to review some of my suggestions, she ultimately declined my comments and filed the amended complaint as originally drafted by her.

On November 1st, the defendants Rockefeller and MIT submitted letter to—for extension of time in this action, which was granted by your Honor until December 12th this year. On November 12th, Ms. Clancy failed to inform me of a significant development in the case and notice of sanctions from defendants Rockefeller and Freiwald, which was asking to dismiss Marciniak II in its entirety with prejudice by December 3.

Your Honor, the first time I saw this letter was as a exhibit to the letter submitted by the defendants, because Ms. Clancy never forwarded me. I never saw this letter from her. Furthermore, Ms. Clancy missed the deadline to respond to a premotion letter filed by defendant Azevedo that day, on November 12th, seeking dismissal of Marciniak II as duplicative of Marciniak I. The court sua-sponte granted her three days to file opposition to Azevedo's premotion letters. She filed her opposition on November 21, again, without any consultation with

me, in which she requested that the court consolidate Marciniak

II with Marciniak I. She wrote, "Plaintiff puts forth her

amendments to her pleading, addresses the claim-splitting

issue, and denies her amended complaint is duplicative."

And following this, as per Court's order, the conference was scheduled on December 4th.

On November 25, Ms. Clancy reached out for a call tomorrow afternoon to discuss the two ongoing matters. During the call on November 26, now for the first time, Ms. Clancy said that her intent was to dismiss Marciniak II and to continue with Marciniak I, and mentioned that defendants Rockefeller and Freiwald contacted her to ask to dismiss the claims as to them. She didn't mention that they wanted to dismiss with prejudice. She slipped with—she slipped about the conference. She slipped her tongue about the conference, and provided the wrong time, saying it's not important and that

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it's only about defendant Azevedo's motion. Ms. Clancy did not tell me that the other party wanted us to agree for dismissal with prejudice by the time of the conference. And also, as I mentioned, she did not forward me the sanction letter.

On December 2nd, I received an email that she was planning to dismiss Marciniak—"was planning to dismiss Marciniak II in its entirety without prejudice and continue with Marciniak I," where she said we will look what other claims can be added. And she confirmed also this on subsequent phone call in late afternoon, December 3rd. Ms. Clancy was pressuring me into making a quick decision to agree with dismissal of Marciniak II to proceed with Marciniak I, and she represented that the gender violence claim was already a particular one and only the individuals had to be I insisted she send me a draft of the stipulation added. first, and she did, and it was the draft of the dismissal without prejudice. I confirmed in writing that I agree with this. However, an hour later she sent another email seeking my agreement to dismiss Marciniak II without explicitly stating that the dismissal will be without prejudice. Ms. Clancy insisted "For confirming in an email your consent to presenting this stipulation of dismissal to the opposing counsel." I saw this message only the following morning and my concerns grew. I also verified that the Gender-Motivated Violence Act was not there in Marciniak I as Mrs. Clancy told me, because Ms. Clancy

removed this suggested amendment and brought it in her—in Marciniak II complaint.

I attended the conference on my own, obtaining its details from Pacer monitor. During the conference, I learned that Ms. Clancy did not represent her next move as she said to me, and she was not seeking to add the individuals to Marciniak I. Was waiting to craft dismissal with prejudice, and it was solely in the court's initiative to dismiss any of Marciniak II should not jeopardize Marciniak I.

I followed up with Ms. Clancy immediately after the conference, informing her that I did not authorize entering into stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and asked her to inform me immediately about her next moves.

Lacking her response, later that day, I terminated in writing my attorney-client contract. I informed that I will do the subsequent filings, which are due on December 11th, and I did not authorize Ms. Clancy's subsequent—Ms. Clancy's filings, which she did on her own, updating the Court about the status.

In summary, your Honor, Ms. Clancy sabotaged my case, either unintentionally, due to her negligence or incompetence, or intentionally with malicious intent through colluding with opposing party. Ms. Clancy's conduct throughout our representation fell short with the standard of care. Instead of actively pursuing amendment of *Marciniak I* as we had

discussed, she filed a duplicative lawsuit and subsequently failed to mitigate the situation. Even after the Court's feedback and instructions, Ms. Clancy failed to communicate with me about crucial case development and provided me with false or misleading information. Ms. Clancy's conduct has been failing to act in my best interests. As soon as I realized that the trust was inevitably broken, I acted diligently. Any suggestion that I authorized Ms. Clancy's action or intentionally delayed seeking resolution is inaccurate and misleading. As a layperson, I relied on her expertise and I trusted her to navigate the legal process effectively. I had no reason to suspect that Ms. Clancy would file a separate lawsuit instead of amending the existing complaint, a decision that has significantly harmed my case.

Furthermore, the decision that I'm merely seeking a do-over is also unfounded. I seek to rectify this situation caused by Ms. Clancy's negligence and ensure a fair opportunity for me to pursue my claims, and to suggest otherwise is to disregard the serious harm that for sure her conduct caused this case and to justice.

THE COURT: So I certainly understand, Ms. Goncalves, that you have a lot of frustration with Ms. Clancy. I don't know what went on during her representation of you, but it's clear that you're very dissatisfied with how she represented you. The problem, though, is that really doesn't involve the

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case before me here, or at least not with respect to the problems in the case that I identified in my opinion. Essentially, my conclusion in the opinion was that this case was impermissibly duplicative of Marciniak I, the case before Judge Carter. And that is because of this doctrine called claim-splitting, as I know you've become familiar with. And essentially that doctrine means that a person cannot bring two different actions on the same subject against the same defendants or defendants in privity with each other. Marciniak I involves claims that are still pending and were brought against MIT and RU, and this action does as well, in addition to Azevedo and Freiwald. Now the problem with Azevedo and Freiwald, as I mentioned, is that the allegations against RU arose from Freiwald's conduct; the allegations against MIT arose from Azevedo's conduct. So that's why you can't maintain, at least in my view—I may be wrong, and you could appeal me and the Second Circuit may disagree with me, but in my view, that's why this case cannot continue before me, this is why your case has to be before Judge Carter, and that's really the fundamental problem here. And the concern that I'm hearing from the defendants is dismissing this case without prejudice doesn't give them any comfort because there may be then just another case filed against them, when you only really can proceed before Judge Carter here.

DR. MARCINIAK: Yes, your Honor. I wanted to address

this issue. So I wanted to stress out that it was my 1 2 intention, always was my intention to bring the claims to 3 the—to the court in one place. I diligently followed the suggestions of NYLAG at that time when I was proceeding pro se 4 5 and I was submitting the first amended complaint, Marciniak I. 6 I mean, I—I was aiming to stay on the *Marciniak I* action. 7 was not my intention never to file the separate action. And as 8 I was describing the events that happened around the 9 representation with the firm Ms. Clancy, Shegerian & 10 Associates, it was-I have proof with the emails. And I was 11 under the belief that she would amend Marciniak I and will 12 amend this complaint. So she did the action that was not 13 authorized by me and which caused the problems that shouldn't 14 be here in the first place, and the case and the claims which 15 are allegedly made should not be compromised, jeopardized by 16 this mistake, and your Honor viewed that, yes, this case should 17 proceed in Marciniak I. I agree. And your Honor also ruled in 18 the order that the case would be dismissed without prejudice, and it was indicative to just let this order be executed and 19 20 not file any amendment, instead just continuing with Marciniak 21 I, and that was the proper case—that was the proper course of 22 So it was again Ms. Clancy's mistake in filing the amended complaint, and again, reiterating the problem of the 23 24 claim-splitting, as I said, the huge incompetence and 25 negligence and her decision on which I didn't have much

influence. Therefore, the defendants' argument that it was my intentional conduct is absurd. I am providing evidence, providing the timeline, and I also have emails with Ms. Clancy, showing that I really didn't have any authority over her actions, which were errors and punished by the Court.

THE COURT: But in light of that, why are you not willing to dismiss this case with prejudice with the understanding—and I'll go back to the defendants to see if this would be agreeable—with the understanding that the dismissal here would not affect any claims currently before Judge Carter or which you may seek to bring before Judge Carter in an amended complaint and he'll decide whether or not to allow them? Why is that not okay?

DR. MARCINIAK: No. I agree. I agree. I agree that under this condition, that any additional claims that I could bring would be only brought in *Marciniak I*, and under the Judge Carter's opinion, I think it's reasonable.

THE COURT: Now, Ms. Baddish, Mr. Wong, what about that? What if this case is dismissed with prejudice except that the dismissal here would not affect any current or future claims before Judge Carter in Marciniak I? In other words, Ms. Goncalves could request to amend her complaint in that case and Judge Carter could decide whether to allow the amended complaint or not, but she would not be precluded from doing so based on the dismissal here.

MS. BADDISH: Your Honor, I think that that's fine. I just want to be clear that we're concerned about adding additional parties, and she has to demonstrate that she has a legal basis to do so, and she actually has since filed a premotion letter seeking leave to amend her complaint in Marciniak I. And we filed a response to that, which we sent to your Honor yesterday.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BADDISH: Yeah. So I think that would be fine. So all claims in this case dismissed with prejudice, and she can bring claims in *Marciniak*, except to the extent that they're currently asserted in *Marciniak I* or Judge Carter grants her leave to assert them in *Marciniak I*, is that—

THE COURT: Correct. Correct.

Mr. Wong?

MR. WONG: Your Honor, I think MIT would be okay with that. I mean, we would just note that just now, in the course of the plaintiff's submission, she noted that she had added the Gender-Motivated Violence Act claim "to address the claim-splitting issue," and so to the extent that that was, like, the whole reason for it, just seems that—I guess it seems that there's not any reason to permit her to kind of allege that as a new claim in the existing action given all of the opportunities that she had, but we're okay with—

THE COURT: And I think the point there is really,

that's for Judge Carter to decide and not me.

Mr. Martin?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor, with the provisos that have been expressed, that's certainly acceptable to Dr. Azevedo.

THE COURT: And are you in a position to sign off on that for your clients, the language? And I'll repeat the language again. But I don't want to put you on the spot if you need to go back to your clients and discuss this any further.

MS. BADDISH: I would feel more comfortable if we just had the opportunity to go back to them. I don't anticipate that there will be an issue.

THE COURT: So let me read to you basically what I have in mind as to the language of the dismissal, and you can let me know if this is agreeable:

to the extent that the dismissal in this case would not affect any current or future claims brought in *Goncalves v*.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, No. 22 Civ. 10959 (ALC)

(S.D.N.Y.)." So that essentially would be the language that I would be thinking about.

"The instant action is dismissed with prejudice except

MS. BADDISH: Your Honor, I was just going to suggest, would you be amenable to adding something that says that this order is not to be construed as plaintiff being permitted to add any claims or parties in *Marciniak I*?

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1 DR. MARCINIAK: No, but your Honor, just a second. Ι think we agreed that I would be permitted to add the claims-2 3 MS. BADDISH: No. Absolutely not. 4 THE COURT: That's absolutely not correct. 5 DR. MARCINIAK: —against the individuals. THE COURT: Ms. Goncalves, let me explain this to you 6 7 Let me take a step back. again. 8 In federal court, different judges resolve different 9 cases on their dockets. My point here is that this case should 10 never have been before me because you already have a case 11 before Judge Carter, who is another judge in this district, but 12 he has his own docket and his own cases. I can't decide what 13 Judge Carter decides; only Judge Carter can do that. So you 14 can make your request to Judge Carter to add claims or add 15 defendants in that case, but that is for him to decide and not 16 Do you understand that? 17 DR. MARCINIAK: Yes, your Honor, I understand. 18 would just be more comfortable if the language speaks to—about 19 additional claims and defendants. 20 THE COURT: "Nothing in this order is to be construed 21 as offering any view as to whether the plaintiff should be 22 permitted to add any claims or defendants in Marciniak I?" 23 MS. BADDISH: Permitting plaintiffs to add? At this point she has to make—she has to satisfy a 24

burden to amend her complaint in Marciniak I.

THE COURT: Correct.

MS. BADDISH: And I want to make sure that this order is not going to be construed or, you know, misrepresented as saying, you know, Judge Cronan indicated that she would be able to add new claims and parties, so I just want to be clear that it shouldn't be construed as permitting her to do so, to Judge Carter.

THE COURT: How about this then: "Nothing in this order should be construed as the undersigned taking a position as to whether the plaintiff should be permitted to add any claims or defendants in *Marciniak I*," we'll call it?

MS. BADDISH: That's okay. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. WONG: And your Honor, just to be clear, this is still reserving your jurisdiction on the Rule 11 issues; is that right?

THE COURT: It is. I guess one question for that is, on the Rule 11 issue, has the time to withdraw under Rule 11 elapsed by now?

MS. BADDISH: Yes. It was December 3rd.

THE COURT: Do you have a sense as to whether you still intend to proceed on that at this point, or you need to think about that some more?

MS. BADDISH: I think we need to confer with our client. At least we do.

THE COURT: Yes. And I don't envision this order,

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assuming everyone is on board with it, expressing any view on the Rule 11 motion, and a motion like Rule 11 is generally considered an ancillary matter that I would still have jurisdiction over even after I terminate the case.

Ms. Goncalves, the language that I just mentioned again, is that agreeable to you?

DR. MARCINIAK: Yes. I don't have any objections.

THE COURT: Okay. And at the risk of really testing the reporter's patience—thank you—let me just read the language one last time, so everyone is on board. This is the language that I'll ask you to go back and confirm that your clients are okay with. And based on Ms. Goncalves's representation, I will assume, unless she says otherwise, she is okay with this language as well.

I would issue an order dismissing the case, and the order would read: "The instant action is dismissed with prejudice except to the extent that the dismissal in this case would not affect any current or future claims brought in Marciniak-Domingues Goncalves Agra v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, No. 22 Civ. 10959 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y.) ("Marciniak I"). Nothing in this order should be construed as the undersigned taking a position as to whether the plaintiff should be permitted to add any claims or defendants in Marciniak I."

And does everyone have that?

25

1 Ms. Goncalves, that language is agreeable to you, 2 correct? 3 DR. MARCINIAK: I think we also said that the language 4 defendants should be added, or the parties. So I didn't hear 5 that this was included, not only claims but also the parties. 6 THE COURT: The last sentence says, "Nothing in this 7 order shall be construed as the undersigned taking a position as to whether plaintiff should be permitted to add any claims 8 or defendants in Marciniak I." Does that work? 9 10 DR. MARCINIAK: Yes. THE COURT: How long do you think you would need to 11 12 consult with your clients to confirm whether that language 13 works? 14 MS. BADDISH: I would say no more than a week. I 15 mean, well, it's the holiday, so I think by the end of next 16 week? 17 THE COURT: End of next week is fine. 18 MS. BADDISH: If that's okay with everyone else. 19 THE COURT: That would be December 27th. And 20 Mr. Martin, that works for you as well? 21 MR. MARTIN: I can make it work, your Honor, yes. 22 THE COURT: If I do not hear from you, can I assume 23 that your clients are on board, if I don't hear anything by 24 December 27th?

MR. MARTIN: That's acceptable to me, your Honor.

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               MS. BADDISH: Yes, your Honor.
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               MR. WONG: Yes, your Honor.
 3
               THE COURT: Great. So I'll either hear from you to
      confirm by December 27th or let me know for whatever reason
 4
 5
      that does not work, or if I don't hear anything, I'll assume
      that everyone is on board and issue an order along those lines.
 6
7
               Okay. Anything further, then, we should take up
8
      today?
 9
               MS. BADDISH: Sorry. How should we contact you?
10
               THE COURT: Oh. I'll issue a minute entry. It should
11
     be a letter filed on the docket, but I'll put that on the
      record, on the docket as well, to let you know that's how you
12
13
      should communicate it. Okay?
14
               Is there anything further then we should take up
15
      today?
            I think we've covered everything.
16
               Great.
17
               MS. BADDISH: Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Thank you, all, and have a good rest of
19
      the day. Take care.
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               THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
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